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In passing the Communications Decency Act of 1996 
(CDA), Congress sought to promote and protect the ever-
evolving free market of voices and ideas available on the 
internet. In order to reach this end, section 230(c) of the 
CDA extends protection from liability to those who provide 
a means for disseminating speech on the web, dubbed by 
the statute as “interactive computer service providers” 
(ICSP). Section 230 protects ICSPs from liability for harm 
inflicted by content created and posted by third parties on 
their respective forums. This Article focuses on a 2015 
Washington State Supreme Court decision, J.S. v. Village 
Voice Media Holdings, LLC., which raised the troubling 
prospect that content requirements prohibiting illegal or 
immoral activities, could potentially remove an ICSP from 
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The Internet has become the primary means for the 
dissemination and consumption of information in the technological 
age. Anticipating these developments, Congress sought to 
“preserve the vibrant and competitive free market”
1
 of ideas and 
information available on the Internet by enacting Section 230(c) of 
the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (“CDA”). Section 
230(c) of the CDA grants immunity to “interactive computer 
service providers” (“ICSPs”) from civil liability for content posted 
by third-party “information content providers” (“ICPs”).
2
  Courts 
have construed and applied the immunity provisions within Section 
230 of the CDA broadly in cases arising from content posted by 
ICSP users.
3 
However, in J.S. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, 
                                                                                                             
1
 47 U.S.C. §230(b)(2) (1996) 
2
 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1996) 
3
 See, e.g., Doe v. Myspace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir.2008); Green 
v. Am. Online (AOL), 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir.3003); Carafano v. 
Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123-24 (9th Cir.2003). 
2
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 12, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol12/iss1/4
2016] THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT IN VILLAGE VOICE 79 
 
LLC. (“Village Voice”), the Washington State Supreme Court 
refused to extend Section 230’s immunity to the defendant, Village 
Voice Media Holdings, LLC., doing business as “backpage.com” 
(Backpage), in a case arising out of advertisements posted on its 
website by a third party. The court allowed the claim to survive 
Backpage’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted based on the plaintiff’s allegations that 
Backpage’s “content requirements” somehow played a “substantial 




This Article begins by explaining the immunity provision 
in Section 230 of the CDA, reviewing the provision’s purpose, and 
providing an account of how courts have interpreted the provision. 
The Article will continue by recommending a test used by some 
courts to determine if an ICSP has “developed” content under the 
CDA, thereby forfeiting immunity. Next, it will analyze the facts, 
holding, and opinions of the Village Voice case to examine the 
legal and logical fallacies in the majority opinion. The Article will 
conclude by discussing the potential policy consequences of the 
holding in Village Voice and the negative consequences it bodes 
for ICSPs in Washington. 
 
I. EXPLANATION OF SECTION 230 
 
Section 230(c) provides ICSPs with immunity from state 
law civil liability for damages arising out of content that they do 
not produce, but merely host. In enacting this provision, Congress 
sought to foster the development of Internet-based communication, 
and to encourage service providers to self-regulate without fear of 
being held liable for content provided by third parties.
5
 Courts 
construe the immunity provision of the CDA broadly and extend 




                                                                                                             
4
 J.S. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC., 184 Wash.2d 95, 103 (2015). 
5




Daheim: How the Washington State Supreme Court Wrongly Applied the Commun








80 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS   [VOL. 12:1 
 
 
A.   How the CDA Works 
 
ICSPs and ICPs are distinguished by their relation to the 
content at issue in any given case. The CDA defines ICSPs as “any 
information service, system, or access software provider that 
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a 
computer server.”
7
 ICPs are defined in the CDA as “any person or 
entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or 
development of information provided through the internet or any 
other interactive computer service.”
8
 Thus, an ICSP could be an 
ICP as well if it plays any material role in developing the content 
in question. 
Section 230(c) provides immunity from civil liability for 
ICSPs from claims that arise out of content posted by third-party 
users, ICPs. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) provides that “[n]o provider or 
user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the 
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) provides, in 
relevant part, that “[n]o cause of action may be brought and no 
liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is 
inconsistent with this section.” Together, these two subsections 
have been read by courts to stand for the principle that Section 
230(c)(1) of the CDA “protects from liability (1) a provider or user 
of an interactive computer service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to 
treat, under a state law cause of action, as publisher or speaker (3) 




                                                                                                             
7
 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2). 
8
 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (emphasis added). 
9
 Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100-01 (9th Cir. 2009). 
4
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B.   Policy Underlying the CDA 
 
Congress had two purposes in offering immunity under the 
CDA: (1) to generally promote the expansion of the free 
marketplace of ideas and innovations presented by the Internet and 
(2) to remove the disincentive for ICSPs to self-regulate posed by 
state-law causes of action.
10
 
In enacting Section 230, Congress intended in part to facilitate 
the growth of the Internet as the predominant source for the 
dissemination and procurement of information and ideas. In 
passing Section 230, Congress explicitly made clear its intention of 
“promot[ing] the continued development of the Internet and other 
interactive computer services and other interactive media.”
11
 
Additionally, Congress explained, Section 230 is designed, at least 
in part, to “preserve the vibrant and competitive free market” of 
ideas that is presented by the Internet.
12
 
Section 230 was also intended to remove disincentives for 
service providers to “self-regulate the dissemination of offensive 
material over their services.”
13
 In so doing, Congress was 
responding to a New York trial court decision
14
 holding an ICSP 
liable for third-party statements because it exercised editorial 
control over the content posted by its users. The court found that 
the defendant Prodigy constituted a publisher under state law 
because it had deleted some messages on its message boards on the 
basis of offensiveness and bad taste.
15
 As a result, Prodigy was 
held legally responsible for the defamatory messages that it had 
failed to delete under the theory that the ICSP had undertaken an 
editorial role and so was subsequently responsible for any and all 
content displayed on its site.
16
  The decision in Stratton Oakmont 
                                                                                                             
10
 28 U.S.C. § 230 (b). 
11
 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1). 
12
 47 U.S.C. §230(b)(2). 
13
 Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir.1997). 
14
 Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995) (unpublished). 
15
 Id. at 3. 
16
 Id. at 4. 
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made clear that where an ICSP exercised editorial control over 
third-party posts, it could be held liable for the content of those 
posts. Concerned that Stratton Oakmont decision would provide a 
disincentive for ICSPs to exert any control over third-party 





C.   How Courts Apply the CDA 
 
Consistent with the policy underlying the CDA, courts have 
consistently construed the immunity provisions in Section 230 
expansively “in all cases arising from the publication of user-
generated content.”
18
 Courts read the language in Section 230(c) as 
providing ICSPs with immunity that is “quite robust.”
19
 Courts 
“apply an expansive definition of ‘interactive computer service 
provider’ and a rather restrictive definition of ‘information content 
provider.’”
20
 In light of Congress’s noted concerns ICSPs qualify 
for immunity from liability, so long as they do not also function as 
an ICP, by producing content for the portion of the statement or 
publication at issue.
21
 Close cases “must be resolved in favor of 
immunity, lest we cut the heart out of Section 230 by forcing 
websites to face death by ten thousand duck-bites, fighting off 
claims that they promoted or encouraged—or at least tacitly 




                                                                                                             
17
 Congressional intent to override such a disincentive can be found in 47 
U.S.C. § 230(b)(4); see also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (stating “§ 230 responded to 
a New York state court decision, Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 
1995 WL 323710 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. May 24, 1995)”). 
18
 Myspace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 418 (5th Cir. 2008). 
19
 J.S. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC., 184 Wash.2d 95, 122 (2015) 




 Carafano, 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 2003). 
22
 Jones v. Dirty World Entertainment Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 408 
(6th Cir. 2014) (citing Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 
1157 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
6
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II. MATERIAL CONTRIBUTION TEST 
 
In Village Voice, the court held that Backpage would be 
liable for third-party advertisements if plaintiffs could show that 
Backpage’s policies somehow helped develop those 
advertisements. Like many other cases involving Section 230 
immunity, Village Voice hinges on the breadth afforded to the 
word “development” in Section 230(f)(3)’s definition of ICP. As 
previously discussed, Section 230(c) provides that “no provider or 
user of an [ICSP] shall be treated as the publisher or speaker” of 
content posted by an ICP.  Section 230(f)(3) further defines an ICP 
as “any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for 
the creation or development of information provided through the 
Internet” (emphasis added). As such, unless a person develops 
content, that individual cannot be held liable for damages arising 
from that content under the CDA. 
 In order to determine whether an ICSP has “developed” 
content in a given case, a few courts have adopted the “material 
contribution” test.
23
 In Hill v. StubHub, Inc.,
 24
 Hill sued StubHub 
for participating in the sale of tickets for more than $3.00 over face 
value; an action considered an unfair and deceptive trade practice 
under North Carolina state law. Hill argued that StubHub was 
participating in a civil conspiracy, along with those who sold 
tickets on its website for excessive profits.
25
 The trial court granted 
Hill’s motion for summary judgment against StubHub, finding that 




 StubHub appealed, arguing that the suit should have been 
dismissed on the grounds that, as an ICSP, Section 230 provided it 
with immunity.
27
 The court agreed and found that plaintiff’s claims 
                                                                                                             
23
 See e.g., Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, LLC, 755 F.3d 398 
(6th Cir. 2014); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d 1157; Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 
S.E.2d 550; 219 N.C.App. 227 (N.C. App. 2012). 
24






 Id. at 555. 
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were barred by Section 230(c).
28
 For an ICSP to forfeit immunity, 
the court held, it must materially contribute to the unlawful 
content.
29
 The court explained that “in order to ‘materially 
contribute’ to the creation of unlawful material, a website must 
effectively control the content posted by third parties or take other 




As a result, the North Carolina Court of Appeals found that 
StubHub could not be found to have materially contributed to the 
unlawful content, simply because it had not taken steps to ensure 
that unlawful content would be posted.
31
 Even if StubHub had 
encouraged sellers on its website to sell at prices higher than $3.00 
over their face value—or had been aware of the risk that tickets 
sold on its website would exceed face value by over $3.00—the 
court reasoned that it still would not have been enough to find that 
it materially contributed to the unlawful content as an ICSP.
32
  
In deciding Village Voice, the Washington Supreme Court 
should have applied the material contributions test. Had the court 
applied the test, it would have held that Backpage neither 
effectively controlled the illegal content posted by third parties, nor 
took actions to ensure the creation of illegal content. 
 
III. THE VILLAGE VOICE CASE 
 
In Village Voice, the Washington Supreme Court allowed 
plaintiffs’ claims to survive a motion to dismiss, holding that their 
allegations of Backpage’s involvement in their claims were 
sufficient to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 
Advertisements featuring plaintiffs—three minor girls, J.S., 
S.L., and L.C. (collectively referred to as J.S.)—had purportedly 
been posted on Backpage.
33
 J.S. was allegedly raped multiple times 
                                                                                                             
28










 Village Voice, 184 Wash.2d 95, 98 (2015). 
8
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by adult customers who responded to the advertisements.
34
 
However, Backpage’s content requirements prohibited 
“advertisements on its website to contain naked images, images 
featuring transparent clothing, sexually explicit language, 
suggestions of an exchange of sex acts for money, or 
advertisements for illegal services.”
35
 Backpage held additional 
requirements for content posted in the ‘escort’ section of its 
website. Backpage’s requirements at the time read: “Backpage 
does not allow ‘any solicitation . . . for any illegal service 
exchanging sexual favors for money or other valuable 
consideration,’ ‘any material on the Site that exploits minors in any 




The advertisements featuring J.S. were posted on 
Backpage’s website without any guidance from Backpage 
personnel. J.S. conceded that all of the advertisements featuring 
J.S. complied with Backpage’s content requirements.
37
 However, 
J.S. alleged that, by setting content requirements that prohibited 
sex trafficking, Backpage had helped pimps and prostitutes evade 
law enforcement by giving the appearance of lawful activity on 
Backpage’s site. As a result, J.S. alleged, Backpage had materially 
contributed to the development of the content at issue. 
 Backpage moved to dismiss the claim, arguing that Section 
230(c) provided it with immunity because it had not contributed to 
the development of the advertisements at issue. The court found 
that the plaintiffs could overcome the motion to dismiss because 
the they had pled facts sufficient to bring an action against 
Backpage. 
 
A.   Procedural Posture/CR 12(b)(6) 
 
The Village Voice case made its way to the Washington 
State Supreme Court on direct appeal from a trial court’s denial of 
                                                                                                             
34






 Village Voice, 184 Wash.2d 95, 98 (2015). 
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Backpage’s motion to dismiss. J.S. made state law claims for 
“negligence, outrage, sexual exploitation of children, 
ratification/vicarious liability, unjust enrichment, invasion of 
privacy, sexual assault and battery, and civil conspiracy.”
38
 In 
response to these claims, Backpage filed a CR 12(b)(6) motion to 
dismiss the suit on the grounds that J.S.’s claims were preempted 
by Section 230(c) of the CDA. Backpage argued that it could not 
be held liable for J.S.’s damages because it did not play a role in 
producing the advertisements at issue. Because the CDA 
immunizes ICSPs that take no part in creating content from 
liability arising therefrom, Backpage could not be held liable for 
the damages arising out of advertisements wholly designed and 
produced by a third party. 
When courts in Washington review CR 12(b)(6) motions, 
they “accept as true the allegations in a plaintiff’s complaint and 
any reasonable inferences therein.”
39
 In response to Backpage’s 
motion, J.S. argued that Backpage played a substantial role in 
contributing to the content of the advertisements at issue, and 




B.   Opinions 
 
The majority opinion in Village Voice, authored by Justice 
Steven C. González, held that dismissal of J.S.’s claims under CR 
12(b)(6) would not be appropriate, based on J.S.’s allegations.
41
 
J.S. claimed that “Backpage.com [knew] the foregoing content 
requirements [were] a fraud and a ruse [] aimed at helping pimps, 
prostitutes, and Backpage.com to continue to evade law 
enforcement by giving the [false] appearance that [it did] not allow 




 Id. at 100 (citing Reid v. Pierce County, 136 Wash.2d 195, 20 (1998). 
40
 Id. at 103. 
41
 In Washington, courts allow claims to be brought, unless it appears 
“beyond a reasonable doubt that no facts exist that would justify recovery.” In 
re Parentage of C.M.F., 179 Wash.2d 411, 418; 314 P.3d 1109 (2013) 
(emphasis added). 
10
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sex trafficking on its website.”
42
 Because of this, they argued, 
“Backpage [had] a ‘substantial role in creating the content . . . of 
the advertisements on its website.’”
43
 Taking as true the plaintiffs’ 
allegations that the content requirements were “specifically 
designed . . . so that pimps can continue to use Backpage.com to 
traffic in sex,”
44
 the court determined that the case could proceed 
and held that the  
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Sheryl Gordon McCloud 
concluded that the plaintiffs’ claims could not overcome Section 
230(c) in this case because “Backpage did not materially 
contribute to the development or creation of the content at issue.”
45
 
Justice Gordon McCloud pointed out that courts interpreting the 
Section 230 of the CDA have read the provision as providing “full 
immunity” for ICSPs in cases where a third party “willingly 
provides the essential published content,” regardless of the editing 
or selection process.
46
 She also criticized the reasoning of the 
majority and concurrence’s misapplication of a Ninth Circuit 
holding involving an ICSP’s material contribution to unlawful 
content on its website.
47
 Ultimately, Justice Gordon McCloud held 
that the CDA should have preempted the case brought by plaintiffs 
for the simple reason that “J.S.’s complaint clearly alleges that 





                                                                                                             
42
 Village Voice, 184 Wash.2d 95, 102 (2015). 
43
 Id. at 102-03. 
44
 Village Voice, 184 Wash.2d 95, 103 (2015). 
45
 Village Voice, 184 Wash.2d 95, 136 (2015) (dissent). 
46
 Id. at 122 (quoting Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F.Supp.2d 
1090, 1098-99, 1118 (W.D. Wash. 2004). 
47
 Village Voice, 184 Wash.2d 95, 131 (2015) (dissent). 
48
 Id. at 116. 
11
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IV. THE COURT’S MISAPPLICATION OF THE CDA 
 
This case was wrongly decided. The Court reached the 
conclusion that “it does not appear ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that 
no facts exist that would justify recovery.’”
49
 This conclusion was 
based on a mistaken interpretation of a landmark Ninth Circuit 
case interpreting the CDA, and reliance on a mistaken legal 
conclusion. 
 
A.   The Misreading of Roommates 
 
The majority and concurrence both read the Ninth Circuit’s 
holding in Fair House Council v. Roommates.com, LLC,
50
 as 
support for the proposition that setting content requirements that 
induce unlawful advertisements creates a material contribution to 
said ads.
51
 However, the facts and reasoning in Roommates 
significantly distinguish it from the case at hand. 
Roommates.com was a website “designed to match people 
renting out spare rooms with people looking for a place to live.”
52
  
The site required users to answer questions about gender, sexual 
orientation, and whether they would bring children into the 
household by selecting from pre-written answer choices in  drop-
down menus.
53
 Because of this practice, Roomates.com was sued 
by two housing groups who argued that the site was renting 
housing based on discriminatory criteria in violation of the federal 
Fair Housing Act (FHA) and California state law.
54
 
Roommates.com asserted Section 230 immunity. However, 
the Ninth Circuit found that Roommates.com had contributed 
materially to the illegal conduct because it had written questions 
aimed at prompting discriminatory preferences, required users to 
answer them, and provided the user with a list of answer choices 
                                                                                                             
49
 Village Voice, 184 Wash.2d 95, 103 (2015). 
50
 521 F.3d 1157, 1162-63 (9
th
 Cir. 2008). 
51
 Village Voice, 184 Wash.2d 95 (2015). 
52
 521 F.3d at 1161. 
53
 Id. at 1164. 
54
 Id. at 1162. 
12
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that it had created.
55
 
The Village Voice Court misread the holding of Roommates 
in holding that Backpage could have forfeited immunity by 
intentionally setting policy requirements that encouraged or 
induced illegal activity. In Roommates, the court held that 
Roommates.com had forfeited liability where it had required users 
to submit unlawful answers to unlawful questions, both of which it 
had created. In contrast, Backpage maintained a policy against a 
certain type of unlawful content. Regardless of whether 
Backpage’s policies were set deceptively—which this Article 
discusses later—Roommates does not provide that setting policies 
against unlawful content invites liability as a material contribution 
to content developed by third parties.  
 
B.   Mistaken Legal Conclusion 
 
The Village Voice court held that plaintiffs’ assertions that 
Backpage’s rules encouraged unlawful content, if true, could 
justify recovery in spite of Section 230. However, previous courts 
have made clear that such immunity is not eliminated, even where 
ICSPs do induce illegal content. “[T]he fact that a website acted in 
such a manner as to encourage the publication of unlawful material 
does not preclude a finding of immunity pursuant to [Section] 
230.”
56
 Even if Backpage had developed its content requirements 
for the purposes of allowing users to evade law enforcement, 
Section 230 immunity would still apply. 
 
C.   Applying the Material Contribution Test to Village Voice 
 
Wider application of the material contributions test would 
simplify Section 230 analysis and ensure broader compliance with 
Section 230. In Village Voice, the Washington Supreme Court 
should have applied the material contribution test. Under this test, 
                                                                                                             
55
 Id. at 1164. 
56
 Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, 560 (N.C. App. 2012); See also 
Jones v. Dirty World Entm’t Recordings, LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 414 (6th Cir. 
2014) (declining to follow an “encouragement” theory of liability). 
13
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Backpage could not be found to have materially contributed to the 
advertisements at issue because it neither controlled the content 
posted by third parties nor ensured the creation of unlawful 
content. Similar to StubHub, even if Backpage had used its policy 
requirements to encourage the advertisements, or known of the risk 
of these sorts of ads, it still could not be said to have materially 
contributed to their content. 
In several respects, the facts of StubHub closely resemble 
those in Village Voice. Backpage users were able to use the site to 
display advertisements, similar to StubHub.
57
 Many advertisers 
used the site to break Washington state laws by advertising for the 
sexual assault and abuse of minors.
58
 However, Backpage had a 
policy against doing exactly what the advertisers did. And, because 
J.S. successfully argued that those policies somehow helped 
advertisers, the Washington Supreme Court held that Backpage 
had forfeited Section 230(c) immunity.
59
  
An analogy to StubHub might be if StubHub had a policy 
against North Carolina sellers advertising the tickets for more than 
$3.00 over their face value, but sellers continued to do so anyway. 
Under the reasoning in Village Voice, if plaintiffs argued that 
StubHub’s policies somehow helped sellers break the law, it would 
then forfeit Section 230 immunity. This result runs contrary to the 
purpose of Section 230. 
The Washington Supreme Court should have applied the 
material contribution test for an accurate application of Section 
230. Under the material contribution test, it would have found that: 
(1) Backpage did not effectively control the content posted by third 
parties, nor (2) did it ensure the creation of unlawful content.  
First, Backpage had minimal control of the advertisements 
posted by third parties. At most, the site asserted some control by 
prohibiting certain illegal content in advertisements.
60
 Further, 
plaintiffs admitted that Backpage provided no guidance 
                                                                                                             
57




 Id. at 101-03. 
60
 Id. at 99. 
14
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whatsoever to the third-party advertisers.
61
 
Second, Backpage did not ensure the creation of unlawful 
content. Backpage had a policy against the sort of illegal content 
posted by third parties. A failure to enforce this policy does not 
forfeit immunity. To hold otherwise would go against the very 




V. POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF VILLAGE VOICE 
 
The court’s decision in Village Voice turns Section 230 on 
its head by allowing a claim against an ICSP for the very activity 
that Congress sought to protect. Section 230 was intended to 
encourage ICSPs to self-regulate by protecting them from state-law 
causes of action, which might allege that such actions constitute 
playing the role of “publisher.”63 Nevertheless, the case at issue 
involves a plaintiff bringing suit against an ICSP for engaging in 
the very sort of self-governance referenced in the statute. As a 
result, the outcome of Village Voice puts other ICSPs in an 
uncertain position with regard to Section 230 protections in 
Washington. 
The Village Voice decision erred primarily by suggesting 
that an ICSP's decision to police its website for illegal activity 
could leave it open to liability. The outcome of this case hinged on 
Backpage’s policy of “not allow[ing] . . . suggestions of an 
exchange of sex acts for money, or advertisements for illegal 
                                                                                                             
61
 Id. at 99 (“J.S. allegedly was featured in Backpage advertisements posted 
in accordance with instructions on Backpage’s website without any special 
guidance from Backpage personnel.”) (emphasis added). 
62
 See Zeran v. America Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (1997) (“The 
amount of information communicated via [ICSPs] is therefore staggering. The 
specter of tort liability in an area of such prolific speech would have an obvious 
chilling effect. It would be impossible for service providers to screen each of 
their millions of postings for possible problems. Faced with potential liability for 
each message republished by their services, interactive computer service 
providers might choose to severely restrict the number and type of messages 
posted. Congress considered the weight of the speech interests implicated and 
chose to immunize service providers to avoid any such restrictive effect.”). 
63
 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
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 In 2011, Washington State Attorney General Rob 
McKenna, along with more than forty other attorneys general 
across the country, sent a letter to Backpage's counsel, demanding 
that the site actively enforce its aforementioned content policies.
65
 
The policies on which the court’s decision rested, were the same 
policies that Backpage was being pressed to enforce less than five 
years prior to the decision. 
This case allows a plaintiff who is able to allege a 
connection between the tortious or illegal conduct of a third party 
and content policies of an ICSP to sustain a claim for damages. J.S. 
was able to overcome Section 230 immunity by merely alleging 
that Backpage, through its content requirements, contributed to the 
development of content posted by third parties on its website.
66
 
Accordingly, if Washington state courts interpret Section 230 
consistent with Village Voice, plaintiffs will be able to overcome 
immunity by simply pleading that a defendant-ICSP’s content 
requirements provided an environment in which tortious conduct 
could occur.  
An example might be where an ICSP maintains a 
prohibition against slander on its website. If a plaintiff alleged that 
this prohibition was a fraud, intended to provide plausible 
deniability in regard to the slanderous actions of third parties, that 
ICSP could be sued for damages arising out of a third party’s 
tortious conduct. This seems a troubling proposition for ICSPs who 
hope to maintain a website free from tortious and illegal activity, 
while also avoiding liability if such activity were to go undetected 
or unremoved. In order to avoid liability under such a theory, it 
seems that ICSPs should be advised to refrain from maintaining 
any sort of protective content requirements lest they be held liable, 
or at the very least dragged into court, for content posted by third 
parties. To allow these sorts of cases to proceed to trial in the face 
                                                                                                             
64
 Village Voice, 184 Wash.2d 95, at 99. 
65
 Sara Green Jean, McKenna, AGs confront backpage.com on prostitution ads, 




 Village Voice, 184 Wash.2d 95, at 100-03. 
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of Section 230 immunity is to misinterpret the law. This 
misinterpretation could have one of two consequences. For one, 
many Washington ICSPs could halt their business activities in 
Washington State, fearing lawsuits arising out of third-party 
content in Washington courts. This would cause a lack of access to 
online services on which many Washington citizens have grown 
dependent. As another consequence, Washington ICSPs may read 
this opinion as instructing them to abstain from holding policies 
relating to third-party content. Either outcome runs contrary to the 




Section 230 was intended to prevent ICSPs from being 
sued for harm caused by third parties. Village Voice 
involved an ICSP that was sued for damages inflicted by a third 
party. 
The CDA should have barred the plaintiffs’ claims in 
Village Voice because they arose out of advertisements that were 
not, in whole or in part, developed by Backpage. Although the 
majority opinion reasoned that Backpage’s specific content 
requirements might essentially constitute “material contributions” 
to the content, there is no basis for this conclusion. Applying the 
material contribution test shows that Backpage played no part in 
ensuring the creation of unlawful content. Merely hosting content 
requirements that prohibit certain content from appearing in 
advertisements on a website does not equate to ensuring the 
creation of unlawful content, even if those content requirements 
were set deceptively. As such, immunity should’ve applied and 
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▪ If you are, or your client is, a Washington ICSP avoid 
maintaining policies regarding content posted by third 
parties on your website. 
 
▪ If you are, or your client is, a Washington ICSP that holds 
policies regarding content posted by third parties on your 
website, enforce those policies vigorously. 
 
▪ If you are, or your client is, a Washington ICSP, and you 
are sued for harm caused through or by content posted on 
your website by a third party, file a motion to dismiss based 
on Section 230 immunity, and cite this Article.  
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